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Abstract
This paper o¤ers two ways to decentralize the constrained-e¢ cient allocation of the Lagos-Wright
(2005) pure currency economy. The rst way has divisible money, take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by buyers,
and a transfer scheme nanced by money creation. If agents are su¢ ciently patient, the rst best is
achieved for nite money growth rates. If agents are impatient, the equilibrium allocation approaches the
constrained-e¢ cient allocation asymptotically as the money growth rate tends to innity. The second
way has indivisible money, take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by buyers, and no government intervention. We
discuss the strict implementation of constrained-e¢ cient allocations and the applicability of our scheme
to economies with Lucas trees, endogenous participation, match-specic heterogeneity, and sequential
competitive markets.
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1 Introduction
The pure currency economy of Lagos and Wright (2005) is explicit about the frictions  lack of commit-
ment/enforcement and absence of public record-keeping  that rule out credit arrangements, making it
amenable to normative analysis and mechanism design. One can characterize the set of allocations that are
incentive feasible given the frictions; one can identify the allocations that maximize social welfare in that
set; and one can look for ways to decentralize the constrained-e¢ cient allocations.
Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009) were the rst to characterize the set of incentive-feasible allocations in
the Lagos-Wright environment. They provided a mechanism, based on planners proposals, to implement
such allocations by assigning the whole match surplus to the consumer if his real balances are equal or greater
than a socially-desirable level, and to the producer otherwise. This trading mechanism does not correspond
to any bargaining solution (such as Nash or proportional bargaining), and it is not the outcome of standard
extensive-form bargaining games.1
In this paper we describe two alternative ways to decentralize the constrained-e¢ cient allocation in the
Lagos-Wright environment. First, we show that when money is perfectly divisible the constrained-e¢ cient
allocation can be decentralized with an extensive form bargaining game whereby buyers make take-it-or-
leave-it o¤ers to sellers and an incentive-compatible transfer scheme nanced with money creation. This
scheme is regressive and species that agents with money holdings above a threshold receive a at transfer.2
If agents are su¢ ciently patient, the rst best is achieved for positive but nite money growth rates. If agents
are impatient, the equilibrium allocation approaches the constrained-e¢ cient allocation asymptotically as
the money growth rate tends to innity.
Second, constrained-e¢ cient allocations can be implemented with indivisible money, a constant money
supply, and the same take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game described above. This second scheme does not
require any government intervention in the form of transfers nanced with money creation. Moreover, it
implements uniquely allocations that are arbitrarily close to the constrained-e¢ cient ones.
Indivisible money can decentralize the constrained-e¢ cient allocation with a simple bargaining game and
a constant money supply for the following reason. When agents choose their money holdings they take into
account its holding cost as measured by the di¤erence between their rate of time preference and the rate of
return of money. However, because this holding cost is not a welfare loss for society  money has to be
1Gu and Wright (2016) gives an alternative trading mechanism than the one in Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009) to implement
the constrained e¢ cient allocation. This alternative mechanism does not correspond to any known bargaining solution either,
but it satises a monotonicity axiom that is not satised by the Hu-Kennan-Wallace mechanism.
2This scheme is related, but di¤erent, from the a¢ ne transfer schemes proposed by Andolfatto (2010) and Wallace (2014)
for competitive economies.
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held by someone  agents choose ine¢ ciently low real balances. By making money indivisible, the social
planner prevents agents from reducing their money holdings below the socially optimal level and reduces
their problem to a binary choice between the constrained-e¢ cient allocation and autarky.
Finally, we discuss in conclusion the applicability of our decentralization scheme to economies with Lucas
trees, endogenous participation, match-specic heterogeneity, and sequential competitive markets.
2 The model
The basic setup is borrowed from Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Time
is discrete, goes on forever, and is indexed by t 2 N0. The economy is populated by a [0; 2] continuum of
innitely-lived agents, divided evenly into a set of buyers, denoted B, and a set of sellers, denoted S. Each
date has two stages: the rst stage has a decentralized market (DM) where agents are matched bilaterally
and at random, and the second stage has centralized meetings (CM).3 In each DM, the measure of pairwise
meetings is  2 [0; 1].
There is a single perishable good produced in each stage, with the CM good taken as the numéraire.
In the CM, all agents have the ability to produce and wish to consume. Agents labels as buyer or seller
correspond to their roles in the DM where only sellers are able to produce and only buyers wish to consume.
Buyerspreferences are represented by the following utility function
E
1X
t=0
t [u(qt) + xt   ht] ;
where   (1 + r) 1 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, qt is DM consumption, xt is CM consumption, and ht is
the supply of hours in the CM. Sellerspreferences are given by
E
1X
t=0
t [ c(qt) + xt   ht] :
The buyers utility of DM consumption, u(q), is increasing and concave, and the sellers disutility of pro-
duction, c(q), is increasing and convex, with u(0) = c(0) = 0. The surplus function, u(q)   c(q), is strictly
concave, with q = arg max [u(q)  c(q)]. Moreover, u0(0) = c0(1) = 1 and c0(0) = u0(1) = 0. All agents
have access to a linear technology to produce the CM output from their own labor, x = h.
There is also an intrinsically useless, perfectly durable asset called money. Money can be either divisible
or indivisible. Lack of record-keeping and private information about individual trading histories rule out
unsecured credit, giving a role for money to serve as means of payment. In addition, individual asset holdings
3One can think of agents as being ex-ante identical and their type as buyer or seller being realized with equal probabilities
at the beginning of the CM. In contrast, in Lagos and Wright (2005) the type is realized in the DM when pairwise meetings are
formed. While these two formulations generate di¤erences for implementation (see, e.g., Rocheteau, 2012), our main proposition
would be una¤ected.
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are common knowledge in a match. We assume that sellers do not carry real balances across periods. It
is with no loss in generality for our normative analysis, and it would be easy to check that sellers have no
incentive to acquire money in the equilibria we will characterize.
We study equilibrium outcomes that can be implemented with a planners proposal. Under divisible
money, a proposal consists of four objects: (i) an initial distribution of money, , and a gross money growth
rate, ; (ii) a sequence of transfer policies,  t : R+ ! R+, where each  t(m) species a transfer of money
(expressed in the numéraire) from the government to buyers at the start of period t (before DM trades);4
(iii) a sequence of CM prices for money, ftg1t=1, in terms of the numéraire; (iv) a sequence of functions in
the bilateral matches, ot : R+ ! R2+, each of which maps the buyers money holdings, mt, into a proposed
trade, (qt; dt) 2 R+  [0; t mt], where qt is the DM output produced by the seller and consumed by the
buyer and dt is the transfer of money from the buyer to the seller (expressed in terms of the numéraire).
As in Wallace (2014),  t(m)  0 because there is no enforcement in pure currency economies and  t(m) is
weakly increasing for the scheme to be incentive-compatible.
Under indivisible money, a proposal is a similar object but we assume money supply is constant. Moreover,
ot : R+ ! R2+, maps the buyers money holdings, m, into (qt; `t) 2 R+(f0; :::;mtg), where `t is a lottery
over monetary transfers, with `t(m) denoting the probability of transferring m units of money, and d(`t)
denoting its expected value in terms of the numéraire good.
The trading procedure in the DM is given by the following game. Given the buyers money holdings and
the associated proposed trade, ot(mt), both the buyer and the seller simultaneously respond with yes or no:
if both respond with yes, then the proposed trade is carried out; otherwise, there is no trade. Since both
agents can turn down the proposed trade, this ensures that trades are individually rational. We also require
any proposed trade to be in the pairwise core.5 Agents in the CM trade competitively against the proposed
prices, which is consistent with the pairwise core requirement in the DM due to the equivalence between the
core for the centralized meeting and competitive equilibria.
The strategy of a buyer, sb, consists of two components for any given trading history ht at the beginning
of period t: (i) sh
t;1
b (m) 2 fyes; nog that maps the buyers money holdings in a DM meeting, m, to his
response to the o¤er ot; (ii) for the divisible money case, s
ht;2
b (m; ab; as) 2 R+ maps the buyers money
holdings, m, the buyers and sellers choices of whether to accept or reject the trade, ab; as 2 fyes; nog, to
4Here we restrict the policy to make transfers after the CM trades only to buyers, but we can also introduce transfers after
agentsDM trades or transfers to sellers. This addition does not change the necessary condition for implementation and we
show in our results that we can implement the constrained e¢ cient allocation with our policy.
5The pairwise core requirement can be implemented directly with a trading mechanism that adds a renegotiation stage as in
Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009), following the yes responses from both agents. The renegotiation stage will work as follows.
An agent will be chosen at random to make an alternative o¤er to the one made by the mechanism. The other agent will then
have the opportunity to choose between the two o¤ers.
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his nal money holdings in the CM; for the indivisible money case, sh
t;2
b (m; ab; as) 2 (N0) maps m and
(ab; as) to a distribution of his nal money holdings in the CM. The strategy of a seller at the beginning of
period-t is a function, sh
t
s (m) 2 fyes; nog, that represents the sellers response to the o¤er ot(m).
Remark 1 Under indivisible money, we could allow the buyer to randomize his money holdings in the CM,
or introduce separate markets for lotteries. Under no arbitrage condition, these two are equivalent as the
price for a lottery ` 2 (N) over money transfers in the CM is P1m=0 `(m)m.
A simple equilibrium is a list, h(sb : b 2 B); (ss : s 2 S); ; fot; t;  tg1t=1i, composed of one strategy for
each agent and the proposal (; fot; t;  tg1t=1) such that: (i) each strategy is sequentially rational given
other playersstrategies; and (ii) the centralized market clears at every date. We require the real balances
to be stationary in the sense that t = t+1 and the transfers are nanced through ination:Z
 t(mt)dFt(mt) = (   1)tMt; (1)
where Ft is the equilibrium distribution of money holdings across buyers at the beginning of date t, andMt is
the average money holding (per buyer) at the beginning of date t (both before the money transfers). In what
follows, we focus on stationary planner proposals where real balances are constant over time and equilibria
such that (i) agents follow symmetric and stationary strategies; (ii) agents always respond with yes in all
DM meetings; and (iii) the initial distribution of money is uniform across buyers. In the divisible money
case, we also require the proposals  t and ot to be stationary in the sense that they depend on the nominal
money holdings only through real balances and are constant when treated as a function of real balances.
Thus, in a simple equilibrium, the proposed DM trades, ot(mt) can be written as o(z) = [q(z); d(z)] with
z = mtt, the real balance, and  t(mt) can be written as (z) (note that for  , its output is also measured
in terms of real balances).
The outcome of a simple equilibrium is summarized by a list, (qp; dp; zp), where (qp; dp) are the terms
of trade in the DM and zp is the buyers real balances when exiting the CM.6 An outcome (qp; dp; zp) is
said to be implementable if it is the equilibrium outcome of a simple equilibrium associated with proposed
DM trades o and a transfer policy  under divisible money or associated with proposed DM trades o under
indivisible money, and if the terms of trade satises the pairwise core requirement. The ex-ante social welfare
of an outcome (qp; dp; zp) is given by
W(qp; dp; zp) = [u(q
p)  c(qp)]:
1  
6Although we allow mixed strategies in the portfolio choice in the CM, we only consider equilibrium outcomes in which all
buyers leave the CM with the same amount of money. Our claim about constrained e¢ ciency is not a¤ected if we also consider
equilibrium outcomes in which buyers leave the CM with the same distribution of money holdings.
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An outcome is said to be constrained e¢ cient if it maximizes the welfare subject to implementability.
Under divisible money and a given mechanism, the value function of a buyer holding z real balances at
the beginning of the CM satises
W b(z) = z + max
z00
 z0 + V b [z0 + (z0)]	 ; (2)
where V b(z) is the value function of a buyer holding z real balances in the DM after the government transfers,
 , have been implemented. To obtain (2) we used the budget constraint according to which next-period real
balances are z0 =  1(h   x + z), so that the post-transfer real balances are z0 + (z0), where  1 is the
gross rate of return of money. Under indivisible money and a given mechanism, the value function of a buyer
holding z real balances at the beginning of the CM satises
W b(z) = z + max
`02(f0;1;2;:::g)
1X
m=0
`0(m)
 m+ V b (m)	 ; (3)
where  is the CM price for money.7 The di¤erence between (2) and (3) is that in the latter money holdings
are restricted to N0 but agents are allowed to randomize over N0.
The Bellman equation in the DM is
V b(z) = 

u [q(z)] +W b[z   d(z)]	+ (1  )W b(z): (4)
The buyer meets a producer with probability , in which case he consumes q(z) and makes a payment d(z)
expressed in terms of the numéraire. When money is indivisible this payment corresponds to the expected
value of a lottery, `. There is a similar set of value functions for sellers, i.e.,
W s(z) = z + V s;
V s =  [ c (qp) +W s (dp)] + (1  )W s(0);
since, with no loss in generality, sellers do not carry money from the CM to the DM, and on the equilibrium
path all DM trades are given by the outcome (qp; dp).
3 Main results: Implementation
The following proposition characterizes the set of incentive-feasible output levels for the environments with
divisible and indivisible money. For each environment we propose a way to decentralize the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation with take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by buyers.
7Alternatively, we could adopt use the formulation with sunspot states and a complete set of state-contigent commodities,
as in Rocheteau, Rupert, Shell and Wright (2008). Our remark 1 is equivalent to the statement that every sunspot equilibrium
allocation can be supported by prices, when adjusted for probabilities, that are constant across states. In this case `(m) is
interpreted as the measure of states where agents choose to purchase m units of money.
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Proposition 1 (Implementation of Constrained-E¢ cient Allocations.) The constrained-e¢ cient
output level in pairwise meetings under both divisible and indivisible money is
qc  max fq :  rc(q) + [u(q)  c(q)]  0g : (5)
(a) Divisible money. If r <  [u(q)  c(q)] =c(q), then there is a 2 (1;+1) and a transfer scheme
nanced with money creation,
(z) =

0
(1   1)c(qp)
if z < c(qp)=
otherwise,
(6)
such that for all  , qp = q is decentralized with buyers take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers.
If r   [u(q)  c(q)] =c(q), then for all  > 1, there is a qp < q decentralized with buyers take-it-or-
leave-it o¤ers and a policy analogous to (6). Moreover, qp is increasing with  and lim!+1 q
p
 = q
c.
(b) Indivisible money. The constrained-e¢ cient allocation is decentralized with indivisible money,
M = 1, and buyers take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers.
Proof. The necessary condition for implementability,  rc(q)+[u(q) c(q)]  0, follows from Rocheteau
(2012). The argument applies to both the economy with divisible money and the economy with indivisible
money, and we only give a sketch for the divisible case here. Suppose that (qp; dp; zp) is an implementable
outcome. The sellers participation constraint in the DM is c(qp)  dp. A necessary condition for buyers
participation in the CM is that he prefers going along with the planners proposal by accumulating zp rather
than leaving the CM with zero real balances and saying "no" to the following DM trade (two consecutive
deviations), i.e.,
 zp + 

 [u(qp)  dp] + z
p

+ 

zp


 (0);
where (0) is the transfer of real balances received by the buyer who deviates by holding no real balances.
Using the budget constraint, (1), (zp=) = (1   1)zp, the inequality above can be rewritten as:
 rzp +  [u(qp)  dp]  (0):
Together with the assumption of no enforcement, (0)  0, the government budget constraint, (zp=) =
(1  1=) zp, and c(qp)  dp  zp= +  (zp=) = zp, it implies the inequality in (5). The highest q 2 [0; q]
solution to  rc(q)+[u(q) c(q)]  0 can be implemented with planners o¤ers as described in Hu, Kennan,
and Wallace (2009).
(a) Decentralization with divisible money. We now show that under divisible money the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation is implemented with take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by buyers, d(z) = c[q(z)] = minfz; c(q)g,
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and the transfer scheme (6). From (4), and using the linearity of W b, the value of the buyer in the DM
solves
V b(z) =  fu [q(z)]  c [q(z)]g+W b(z): (7)
Substituting V b(z) into (2) the buyers choice of real balances (assuming a solution exists) is given by
max
n
~U(); U^()
o
where
~U() = sup
z< 1c(q)

 

   


z + 

u  c 1(z)  z
U^() = max
z 1c(q)

 

   


z +  [u(q)  c(q)] + (1   1)c(q)

;
where ~U() is the net expected utility of the buyer if he does not receive the transfer and U^() is his net
utility if he receives the transfer, which requires that he holds at least  1c(q) real balances. It is clear that
U^() = U^   rc(q) +  [u(q)  c(q)] :
Note that ~U() is strictly decreasing in , ~U(1) > U^ , and it converges to zero as  tends innity. Hence,
provided that  r+  [u(q)  c(q)] =c(q) > 0, so that U^ > 0, there is a 2 (1;+1) such that for all  ;
~U()  U^ . Buyers accumulate z =  1c(q) real balances, which become c(q) after the policy, and trade
the rst best in the DM.
Consider next the case  r +  [u(q)  c(q)] =c(q)  0. For any given  > 1 denote qp the largest q
that solves:
 rc(qp) + 

u
 
qp
  c  qp = max
z0

 

   


z + 

u  c 1(z)  z : (8)
Suppose (z) = (1  1)c(qp) if z   1c(qp) and (z) = 0 otherwise. The buyers net utility from choosing
z   1c(qp) is
U^() = max
z 1c(qp)

 

   


z +  fu[q(~z)]  c[q(~z)]g+ (1   1)c(qp)

;
where ~z = z + (1    1)c(qp). By the denition of qp it follows that  

 


z +  fu[q(~z)]  c[q(~z)]g is
decreasing in z for all z   1c(qp). Hence the optimal choice is z =  1c(qp) and
U^() =  rc(qp) + 

u
 
qp
  c  qp .
By the same reasoning as above, for all 0   buyers optimal choice of real balances is z =  1c(qp). As 
tends to innity, the right side of (8) approaches 0 and qp approaches q
c by below.
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(b) Decentralization with indivisible money. Now we decentralize the constrained-e¢ cient allocation
with indivisible money. The proposal has all buyers receive exactly one unit of money, M = 1 at t = 0, the
price for money in CM is  = c(qc)  c(q), and in each DM meeting, the buyer who holds m units of money
makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (without lotteries) to the seller. The buyers problem is:
max
q;`2(f0;:::;mg)
"
u(q) 
mX
m0=0
`(m0)m0
#
s.t.   c(q) +
mX
m0=0
`(m0)m0 = 0: (9)
Note that because of quasi-linearity, we may replace the lottery with its expected value d (in terms of the
numéraire) which ranges (continuously) from 0 to m. The value function for a buyer holding m units of
money is V b(m) that solves (7). Substituting V b(m) into the buyers CM value function, his CM problem
can be re-expressed as
max
m2N0

 rm+  max
d2[0;m]

u  c 1(d)  d ; (10)
where r = (1  )= .
Since u  c 1() is strictly concave in m, the buyers maximization problem (10) would have a unique
solution if money were perfectly divisible. This solution is denoted as m 2 R+. However, because money
is indivisible, this solution may not be feasible. Let [m] denote the integer part of m. Consequently, (10)
has, at most, two solutions which are [m] and [m] + 1.
The market clearing condition in the CM requires that buyers prefer holding one unit of money instead
of two or zero. The condition for preferring one unit of money to two is
 r+  u  c 1 ()     r2+  [u (q2)  c(q2)] ; (11)
where q2 = minfq; c 1(2)g. The condition for preferring one unit of money to zero is given by
 r+  u  c 1 ()    0: (12)
It then su¢ ces to show that  = c(qp)  c(q) satises (11) and (12).
We separate two cases.
(a) qp = q. Condition (11) collapses to  rc(q)   r2c(q), which is satised. Condition (12) can be
rewritten as
c(q)  
r + 
u(q); (13)
and this follows directly from (5).
(b) qp < q. In this case,  r + [u  c 1 ()   ] = 0, which implies (12) holds. For any 0 > ,
 r0 + [u  c 1  0  0] < 0. Hence, if 2 < c(q), (11) is satised since
 r2+  u  c 1 (2)  2 < 0 =  r+  [u(qp)  c(qp)] :
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Now suppose that 2  c(q) >  = c(qp). Since  r0 + [u  c 1  0   0] < 0 for all 0 > ,  rc(q) +
[u(q)   c(q)] < 0, and hence (11) is satised as 2  c(q). Finally, note that since buyers are willing
to hold one unit against zero or two, he is willing to hold one unit against any mixed strategy over money
holdings. 
Constrained-e¢ cient allocations with divisible money coincide with constrained-e¢ cient allocations with
indivisible money. Those allocations can be implemented by planners proposals, as in Hu, Kennan and
Wallace (2009), that specify that the buyer receives the whole match surplus if he holds z  c(qc); otherwise,
the buyer receives no surplus.
Proposition 1 o¤ers two alternative ways to decentralize constrained-e¢ cient allocations with an extensive-
form bargaining game whereby the buyer makes take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to sellers. If money is divisible,
buyers can be incentivized to hold the socially-optimal real balances by receiving a transfer of money if
z  c(qc)= and no transfer otherwise.8 This transfer exactly compensates agents who hold the socially
optimal real balances for the ination tax, while the ination tax makes deviations costly. If qc = q this
transfer scheme can be nanced with a nite money growth rate. If qc < q, the constrained-e¢ cient allo-
cation is only approached asymptotically as the money growth rate tends to innity.9 Intuitively, ination
must be innite so that a buyer who defects and holds less than c(qc)= ends up with no real balances in
the next DM and therefore receives no surplus. Output and social welfare are monotone increasing with the
money growth rate when implemented through  . This is in contrast with the negative welfare e¤ects of
ination engineered through lump-sum transfers. However, this scheme works as intended only if groups of
agents cannot exploit the regressive transfers by pooling their money holdings while holding less than c(qc).
We rule out such group deviations by assuming that transfers occur at the start of the period when agents
cannot meet each other.
If money is indivisible, then the buyers take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game implements the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation without any government intervention: the money supply is constant and there is no
transfer. Buyers do not need to be incentivized with a transfer because their only relevant choice is to hold
one unit of money or zero. By choosing the appropriate price for money in the CM, the constrained-e¢ cient
allocation is incentive feasible and holding one unit of money dominates holding none. Note that although
8While it achieves the same purpose, our transfer scheme di¤ers from the one in Andolfatto (2010) in that transfers occur
after the CM and before agents are subject to the idiosyncratic DM shocks. (The DM in Andolfattos model is competitive.)
As a result, at the time of the transfer the distribution of money is degenerate, which allows us to use a simple step function
and to eliminate the redemption fee. Our scheme is also a limiting version of the regressive scheme in Wallace (2014) where the
slope of the transfer is innite.
9This result is in contrast with Andolfattos (2010) claim that under an appropriately designed policy the equilibrium
allocation can be made arbitrarily close to the rst-best. The equilibrium allocation can be made arbitrarily close to the
constrained-e¢ cient allocation, as dened in Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009), which only coincides with the rst best when
the rate of time preference is su¢ ciently low.
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we allow randomization in the CM, this logic is not a¤ected.
This result illustrates a socially benecial role of indivisible money. While divisible money expands the
set of feasible trades in pairwise meetings (see, e.g., Berentsen and Rocheteau, 2002), it also expands the
set of admissible deviations in the CM, allowing for deviations that are individually optimal but not socially
optimal. Indeed, buyers choose their real balances to maximize their expected DM surplus net of the cost of
holding real balances. Under divisible money and take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers q solves rc0(q) = [u0(q)  c0(q)].
The rate of time preference does not enter the planners objective, which consists of the sum of the DM match
surpluses. As a result, buyers choose lower real balances than the ones that implement the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation. Indivisible money makes such deviations unavailable.
If money is indivisible andM = 1 there is a range of values for  that are consistent with market clearing.
We now show how to implement uniquely a "near-constrained-e¢ cient" allocation by setting M < 1, i.e.,
money is scarce in the sense that not all buyers can hold one indivisible unit of money.10 Market clearing in
the CM implies that buyers must be indi¤erent between holding one unit of money or zero, i.e.,
 r+  [u(q)  c(q)] = 0;
where q = minfc 1(); qg by the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er bargaining game. If r   [u(q)  c(q)] =c(q),
then the value of money coincides with the one at the constrained-e¢ cient allocation,  = c(qc)  c(q), and
lotteries are not used. If r <  [u(q)  c(q)] =c(q), then  > c(q). In this case the DM trade is given by
(q; `) with `(1) = c(q)= < 1.11 Moreover, the equilibrium price of money is independent ofM , i.e., money
is neutral. Hence, as M approaches 1 the unique steady-state equilibrium converges to the equilibrium that
implements the constrained-e¢ cient allocation.12
Proposition 2 (Strict Implementation) For all M < 1, there is a unique steady-state monetary equilib-
rium of the economy with indivisible money and take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by buyers and it is such that q = qc.
As M % 1, the equilibrium allocation converges to a constrained-e¢ cient allocation.
4 Extensions
We conclude with four extensions to discuss the robustness of our decentralization scheme with indivisible
money. First, we study an economy with Lucas trees to show that Proposition 1 can be generalized to the
10Strict implementation here is in terms of the existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium. As is standard in monetary
models, there could be other non-stationary equilibria.
11Lotteries are useful when the rst-best is implementable with a slack participation constraint, as in Berentsen, Molico,
and Wright (2002). If lotteries are not feasible (let say, because agents do not have access to a nonmanipulable randomization
device) one can still implement uniquely qc = q by adopting a bargaining solution or a bargaining game that gives sellers some
bargaining power.
12The equilibrium correspondence is upper hemi continuous at M = 1 and the socially desirable allocation can only be
obtained as M % 1.
10
case of real assets (or claims on real assets). Second, we study an economy with endogenous participation
as way to illustrate that the buyers-take-all bargaining game does not always decentralize the constrained
e¢ cient allocation. Third, we briey review an economy with match-specic heterogeneity to illustrate
conditions under which indivisible money fails to implement constrained-e¢ cient allocations (in the absence
of lotteries). Fourth, we consider an economy with sequential competitive markets to provide an example
where indivisible money might outperform a transfer scheme.
4.1 Lucas trees
Suppose there is a xed supply, A > 0, of innitely-lived Lucas trees, where each Lucas tree pays one
unit of numéraire in the CM, as in Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo (2007) and Lagos (2010). The
constrained-e¢ cient allocation when assets are divisible is characterized in Hu and Rocheteau (2015). Sup-
pose trees are not portable and the planner is the only entity that can produce claims on the trees that can
be authenticated in the DM. The planner produces M = 1 indivisible claims that yield  = A in terms of
numéraire each. We decentralize the constrained-e¢ cient allocations with take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by buyers.
We focus on the case where c(q) > (1 + r)=r so that the constrained-e¢ cient allocation is not achieved
with divisible Lucas trees as means of payment. The buyers portfolio choice in the CM is:
max
m2N0
f  (r  )m+  [u(q)  c(q)]g : (14)
The opportunity cost of holding money is reduced by the dividend of the claims on Lucas trees. An equilib-
rium with c(q) = c(q) = +  exists if
  rc(q
)   [u(q)  c(q)]
1 + r
; (15)
which is the condition to implement the rst best in Hu and Rocheteau (2015). The rate of return of money,
= = =[c(q)   ], is less than r and it is increasing with . If q = q is not implementable, then, by the
same reasoning, q solves
rc(q) =  [u(q)  c(q)] + (1 + r);
which is the constrained e¢ cient output level.
4.2 Endogenous participation
Suppose now there is endogenous participation of sellers, as in Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Sellers who
wish to participate in the DM incur a disutility cost, k > 0 and k < u(q)   c(q). The measure of
participating sellers is denoted n and the measure of matches in the DM is (n), where (n) is increasing
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and concave. The planner chooses (q; n) to maximize (n) [u(q)  c(q)]   kn subject to the participation
constraints  rd + (n) [u(q)  d]  0 and  k + (n) [d  c(q)] =n = 0 (assuming n > 0). Here we only
consider implementation of the rst best, under which n = n with 0(n) [u(q)  c(q)] = k. To do so, we
decentralize the rst best with the generalized Nash bargaining solution,
q = arg max
q0
[u(q)  ] [ c(q) + ]1  : (16)
where  is the buyers bargaining power. The trading mechanism in the previous section, take-it-or-leave-it
o¤ers by buyers, corresponds to  = 1. In order to implement q = q the value of the indivisible money is
 = c(q) + (1  )u(q), which is consistent with market clearing provided that
 r [c(q) + (1  )u(q)] + (n) [u(q)  c(q)]  0: (17)
The measure of sellers solves the free-entry condition:
(n)
n
(1  ) [u(q)  c(q)] = k; (18)
where n = n if  = 1  0(n)n=(n). So generalized Nash bargaining and indivisible money decentralize
the rst best provided that the Hosios condition holds.
4.3 Match heterogeneity
We introduce match specic heterogeneity as in Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) by assuming that the buyers
utility in the DM is "u(q) where " 2 [0; 1] is the realization of a random variable with c.d.f. F ("). Assuming
that " is common knowledge in a match, an o¤er with indivisible money and lotteries is, with a slight abuse
of notation, a mapping o(") = [q("); d(")], where q(") is DM output and d(")   is the expected real
value of the money transfer. The rst-best outcome is implementable with buyers take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers,
indivisible money, M = 1, and lotteries, if the price,  = c(q1), clears the money market:
 rc(q1) + 
Z
["u(q" )  c(q" )] dF (")  0; (19)
where q" = arg maxq f"u(q)  c(q)g is the rst-best output level. For all "  1, the o¤er, o(") = [q" ; c(q" )],
is feasible with lotteries since c(q" )  . In all matches buyers consume the rst best and o¤er a lottery
that compensates sellers for their disutility of production. According to (19) for the market to clear buyers
must (weakly) prefer to hold one unit of money instead of 0. This condition requires that the holding cost of
money, the rst term on the right side of (19), is no greater than the expected surplus in the DM, the second
term on the right side of (19). Without lotteries, this outcome is not implementable with indivisible money
because this would require c(q" )    "u(q" ) for all " 2 [0; 1]. The value of money must be su¢ ciently
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large to cover the sellers disutility in all matches, but it cannot be too large in order to prevent buyers from
hoarding their unit of money. Clearly, these inequalities cannot hold for both " = 1, in which case   c(q1),
and "  0, in which case   "u(q" )  0.
4.4 Sequential competitive markets
Suppose all markets (CMs and DMs) are competitive, as in Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Andolfatto
(2010). We reinterpret  as both the probability that a buyer wants to consume in the DM and the probability
that a seller is able to produce. Let p denote the price of the DM good in terms of the CM good. Because
money is indivisible and we do not allow for lotteries, q 2 f0; =p; 2=p; :::g. Market clearing in the DM
requires:
c


p

   u


p

(20)
 m+ c

m
p

  + c


p

for all m  2: (21)
Inequalities (20) require that buyers want to sell their unit of money while sellers want to acquire one unit
money. Inequality (21) guarantees that sellers do not want to acquire more than one unit of money. With
no loss, we restrict our attention to equilibria such that c(=p) = , in which case (20)-(21) hold if q  q.
Market clearing in the CM requires:
 r+ 

u


p

  

 0 (22)
 rm+ 

u

m
p

 m

 0 for all m  2: (23)
The rst best, q, is implementable if c(q)  +ru (q). Otherwise, one can implement the highest q such
that c(q) = +ru (q). So with indivisible money one can implement the same allocations as the ones of
the economy with pairwise meetings. The lack of divisibility of money restricts choices in the CM, thereby
preventing agents from choosing ine¢ ciently low real balances. It also prevents deviations by coalitions of
agents in the DM, thereby making the core requirement less stringent.
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